In the context of fourteenth-century Spanish politics, it was quite something to be awarded the sobriquet 'Cruel'

Pedro the Cruel was so called because of his penchant for murder. In the context of fourteenth-century Spanish politics, it was quite something to be awarded the sobriquet 'Cruel'

R. Irwin, The Alhambra (2004), 77

A people which has hopelessly fallen in the scale of nations and deserved its humiliation

The true memorial of the Moors is seen in the desolate tracts of utter barrenness, where once the Moslem [sic] grew luxuriant vines and olives and yellow ears of corn; in a stupid, ignorant population where once wit and learning flourished; in the general stagnation and degradation of a people which has hopelessly fallen in the scale of nations and deserved its humiliation.

S. Lane-Poole, quoted in R. Irwin, The Alhambra (2004), 18

We are also asking him to witness our dying

The doctor is the familiar of death. When we call for a doctor, we are asking him to cure us and t relieve our suffering, but, if he cannot cure us, we are also asking him to witness our dying. The value of the witness is that he has seen so many others die. (This, rather than the prayers and last rites, was also the real value which the priest once had.)

J. Berger, A fortunate man (1967; 2016 edition), 70

If one didn't care for tradition and had no aesthetic sensibility

And really, if one didn't care for tradition and had no aesthetic sensibility, stock-car racing would have much to recommend it. It's possible to see how Nick prefers it to horse racing. There's something nice about people cheering, as they were tonight, for their friends and townsmen rather than for their own hope of gain (there's no betting at auto races).

A. Lurie, Real People (1969), Collected edition (1999), 440

An excuse for occupying the terrain and masking the vacuity of the content

For too long economists have sought to define themselves in terms of their supposedly scientific methods. In fact, those methods rely on an immoderate use of mathematical models, which are frequently no more than an excuse for occupying the terrain and masking the vacuity of the content.

T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (2013), 974

Nearly one-sixth of each cohort will receive an inheritance larger than the amount the bottom half of the population earns through labour in a lifetime.

Inheritance did not come to an end: the distribution of inherited capital has changed, which is something else entirely. ... In the nineteenth century about 10% of a cohort inherited amounts greater than this [a lifetime income of those in the bottom half of income distribution]. This proportion fell to barely more than 2 percent for cohorts born in 1910-1920 and 4-5 percent for cohorts born n 1930-1950. According to my estimates, the proportion has already risen to about 12 percent of cohorts born in 1970-1980 and may well reach or exceed 15 percent for cohorts born in 2010-2020. In other words, nearly one-sixth of each cohort will receive an inheritance larger than the amount the bottom half of the population earns through labour in a lifetime.

T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (2013), 420-1

The current prevalent fears of growing Chinese ownership are a pure fantasy

In particular, it is important to stress that the current prevalent fears of growing Chinese ownership are a pure fantasy. The wealthy countries are in fact much wealthier than they sometimes think. The total real estate and financial assets net of debt owned by European households today amount to some 70 trillion euros. By comparison the total assets of the various Chinese sovereign wealth funds plus the reserves of the Bank of China represent around 3 million euros, or less then one-twentieth of the former amount.

T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st century (2013), 463

The magnitude of the changes initiated by the French Revolution should not be overstated

The magnitude of the changes initiated by the French Revolution should not be overstated, however. Beyond the probable decrease of inequality of wealth between 1780 and 1810, followed by a gradual increase between 1810 and 1910, and especially after 1870 , the most significant fact is that inequality of capital ownership remained relatively stable at an extremely high level throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this period [in France] the top decile consistently owned 80 to 90 percent of the total wealth.

T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (2013), 342

The most one can say is that state intervention did no harm

In fact, neither the economic liberalization that began around 1980 nor the state interventionism that began in 1945 deserves such praise or blame. France, Germany, and Japan would very likely have caught up with Britain and the United States following their collapse of 1914-11945 regardless of what policies they adopted (I say this with only slight exaggeration). The most one can say is that state intervention did no harm. Similarly, once these countries had attained the global technological frontier, it is hardly surprising that they ceased to grow more rapidly than Britain and the United States or that growth rates in all the wealthy countries more or less equalized... Broadly speaking the US and British policies of economic liberalization appear to have had little effect on this simple reality, since they neither increased growth nor decreased it.

T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (2013), 98-99

It’s a problem of identity. Many of my American friends feel they don’t have enough of it.

It’s a problem of identity. Many of my American friends feel they don’t have enough of it. They often feel worthless, or they don’t know how they feel. Identity is the number-one national problem here. There seems to be a shortage of it in the land, a dearth of selfhood amidst other plenty—maybe because there are so many individual egos trying to outdo each other and enlarge themselves.

...

A culture talks most about what most bothers it: the Poles talk compulsively about the Russians and the most minute shifts of political strategy. Americans worry about who they are.

E. Hoffman, Lost in Translation (1989), 262 & 264

You’ve seen people live perfectly happily within their less than perfect unions

Wouldn’t your unhappiness be just the same as here? No, it wouldn’t. It would exist within the claustrophobia of no choice, rather than the agoraphobia of open options. It would have different dimensions, different weight. But surely an incompatible marriage is unacceptable. An American notion. A universal notion. Women in Bengal rebel against bad marriages, for God’s sake. Women in Bengal don’t rebel against emotional incompatibility. They wouldn’t understand what you mean. But I’m not in Bengal! If you were in Poland, you’d be making a sensible accommodation to your situation. You’ve seen people live perfectly happily within their less than perfect unions.

E. Hoffman, Lost in Translation (1989), 230

There is still room in hell for you; we don't want our heaven crammed

We are the sweet selected few
All others may be damned
There is still room in hell for you
We don't want our heaven crammed

Baptist hymn, unknown. Quoted in A. Bloom, 'Ecumenism' [1973], Sobornost 37:1 (2005), 14

The conservatives of the sentiments believe that recovering their own forgotten history is an antidote to shallowness

In our highly ideological times, even nostalgia has its politics. The conservatives of the sentiments believe that recovering their own forgotten history is an antidote to shallowness. The ideologues of the future see attachment to the past as that most awful of all monsters, the agent of reaction. It is to be extracted from the human soul with no quarter or self-pity, for it obstructs the inevitable march of events into the next Utopia. Only certain Eastern European writers, forced to march into the future too often, know the regressive dangers of both forgetfulness and clinging to the past. But then, they are among our world’s experts of mourning, having lost not an archaeological but a living history.

E. Hoffman, Lost in Translation (1989), 115

So they could remain within their old nationality even at the cost of leaving home

They made this journey on a rattling truck filled with potato sacks and other people trying as quickly as possible to cross the new borders so they could remain within their old nationality even at the cost of leaving home.

E. Hoffman, Lost in Translation (1989), 8